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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under U.C.A. §782a-3(2)(k) .

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

It was error for the trial court to grant W.H, Burt
Explosives1 motion for a directed verdict, because there was
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a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the inferences to
be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in favor
of Mr. Bailey for W.H. Burt Explosives1 failure to warn.

A motion for a directed verdict presents a question of
law that has the same standard of review in both the trial
and appellate courts as set forth in Steffensen v. Smith's
Management Corp.. 820 P.2d 482 (Utah App. 1991), cert,
granted, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992):
A directed verdict is only appropriate when the
court is able to conclude that reasonable minds
would not differ on the facts to be determined
from the evidence presented. Management Comm. v.
Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah
1982) . A directed verdict cannot stand when,
reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the losing party, "there is a reasonable basis
in the evidence and in the inferences to be drawn
therefrom that would support a judgment in [the
losing party's] favor." Id. at 898; see Penrod v.
carter, 737 P.2d 199, 200 (Utah 1987).

DETERMINATIVE LAW

RULE
U.R.C.P. 50(a)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS

This case arises out of a mine explosion that injured
Douglas Bailey and killed his friend, Wally Muir, while they
were using safety fuse sold by W.H. Burt Explosives, Inc., and
manufactured by Apache Powder Company. Plaintiff has settled
with Apache Powder Company.

The sole remaining appellee is

W.H. Burt Explosives, Inc., and this appeal involves the
motion for a directed verdict as to "the allegation in the
complaint that W.H. Burt (Explosives) negligently failed to
provide sufficient instructions and/or warnings concerning
the use of safety fuse in blasting operations" (T.643, Line
17), and the granting of said motion. ((T.655, Line 16)

FACTS

1. Mr. Bailey was injured and Mr. Muir was killed in an
explosion while 25 to 3 0 fuses were being individually lit
with a hand-held lighter instead of with igniter cord and
igniter (thermalite) connectors. (T.376, Line 8)
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2.

The injury and death would not have occurred if Mr.

Bailey and Mr. Muir had purchased and used igniter cord and
igniter connectors.

3.

(T.640, Line 18)

Defendant W.H. Burt Explosives filled an order that

provided everything needed to light fuses by hand (T.433,
Line 20), but W.H. Burt Explosives did not warn or instruct
Mr. Bailey that he should purchase and use igniter cord and
igniter connectors.

4.

(T.560, Line 18)

W.H. Burt Explosives was negligent in filling this

particular order for explosives without stating to its customer
that he should also purchase igniter cord, igniter connectors,
and stemming which would have prevented his injuries from the
explosion that injured him.

(T.560, Line 9)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

It was error for the trial court to grant W.H. Burt
Explosives1 motion for a directed verdict, because there was
a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the inferences to
be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in favor
of Mr. Bailey for W.H. Burt Explosives1 failure to warn.
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ARGUMENT

WHEN THE EVIDENCE IS REVIEWED IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE
TO MR. BAILEY, REASONABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER ON THE FACTS TO
BE DETERMINED FROM THAT EVIDENCE, CREATING A JURY QUESTION.

At the close of plaintiff's case, W.H. Burt Explosives
moved for a directed verdict as to "the allegation in the
complaint that W.H. Burt negligently failed to provide
sufficient instructions and/or warnings concerning the use of
safety fuse in blasting operations." (T.643, Line 17)

A motion for a directed verdict presents a question of
law that has the same standard of review in both the trial
and appellate courts as set forth in Steffensen v. Smith's
Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482 (Utah App. 1991), cert,
granted, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992):
A directed verdict is only appropriate when the
court is able to conclude that reasonable minds
would not differ on the facts to be determined
from the evidence presented. Management Comm. v.
Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah
1982) .
A directed verdict cannot stand when,
reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the losing party, "there is a reasonable basis
in the evidence and in the inferences to be drawn
therefrom that would support a judgment in [the
losing party's] favor." Jd. at 898; see Penrod v.
Carter. 737 P.2d 199, 200 (Utah 1987).

6

In applying this standard of review to the evidence
presented during plaintiff's case, the jury instructions that
would be given to the jury if the matter went to a jury
should be considered.

In opposing the motion for a directed

verdict, plaintiff's counsel read an applicable proposed
model Utah jury instruction to the court (T.650, Line 4):
One who supplies a product for another to use is
liable in negligence for injuries which were
proximately caused by the use of the product,
provided that the injury resulted from a use of
the product that was reasonably foreseeable by
the supplier. If the supplier knew or had reason
to know that the product was or was likely to be
dangerous for the use for which it was supplied,
and two, had reason to believe that those for
whose use the product was supplied would not
realize its dangerous condition, and three, failed
to exercise reasonably care to inform them of its
dangerous condition or of the facts which made it
likely to be dangerous. (MUJI 12.11)

An additional jury instruction that would be given to
the jury is proposed MUJI 3.6:

Because of the great danger involved, those who
are engaged in selling explosives are held to a
higher-than-ordinary standard of care and must
exercise extra caution for the protection of
themselves and others. The greater the danger,
the greater the care that must be used.
An additional jury instruction that would be given to the
jury is proposed MUJI 3.8:
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When deciding whether a person is negligent, you
may consider customs of behavior, such as local
customs, business customs or industry customs.
However, following a custom does not necessarily
mean a person exercised ordinary care. It is
merely a factor you may consider. A custom or
standard may be negligent in and of itself.

Evidence in this case includes Mr. Bailey's testimony
in response to W.H. Burt Explosives' cross-examination during
Mr. Bailey's case in chief (T.559, Line 22):

Q. (By Mr. Christensen) I'm simply asking you if
you're claiming Burt, not Apache but Burt, you
understand that's my client, should have told you
something that they didn't tell you?
A.

I believe they should yes.

Q.

And what's that?

A. It—I didn't know it wasn't permissible to
use the method I was using, because I have never
had any problem with it. And as far—I do not
believe that you were wrong in the product, 'cause
you never had no way to know that the product was
unsafe.
I will say that, you had no way of
knowing the product was unsafe.
Q. Well, and are you now saying you believe the
method you used was impermissible, was wrong?
A. I'm not saying it was wrong; but if it was,
at the time, I believe I should have been told.
Q. Well, as I understood your testimony, you said
that Burt didn't ask and you didn't tell them
anything.
A.

That—that is true.
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Q. You didn't go in and tell W.H. Burt, I'm going
to go light 25 to 3 0 charges, stand there at the
face and light those with a spitter, did you?
A.

No.

I did not.

Q.

You simply bought the product and left?

A. I bought the product thinking I had a safe
product, yes.
Q. And you're certainly not claiming you should
have been given more of the Do's and Don't's
booklets, are you?
A.

No.

I'm not.

Q.

You had plenty of those, didn't you?

A. Yes.
Q. And I've forgotten, yesterday, but it was
established, as I recall, that you had received
more than one copy with the materials you bought
at Burt?
A. Yes.
Q. And that was something you were well familiar
with, anyway?
A.

Pretty well, yes.

Q. I am assuming that because of your long years
of experience in explosives, you've passed tests
in California—
A.

Uh huh.

Q.
— o n the Do's and Don't's, you've trained
other miners and so forth; that you didn't
actually sit down after you bought the stuff from
Burt and read the Do's and Don't's, did you?
A.

No.

I did not.

Q.

You didn't feel like you needed to?

A. No, I didn't, 'cause I figured I was using a
safe method, yes.
9

Q. Well, and you figured you already knew what
was in those?
A.

Yes.

Pretty well.

Q. Throughout your career, you've probably read
those many, many times, haven't you?
A. Yes.

W. H. Burt Explosives' attorney explained the abovequoted line of questioning as follows (T.624, Line 23):

I asked him what he claimed in the way of things,
factual events that happened when he bought the
fuse, if, based on his experience as a miner, he
felt something had been done improperly.

Mr. Bailey ignited 25 to 3 0 white wax safety fuses
individually using a hand-held lighter.

Although the order filled by W.H. Burt included all
explosives products needed to ignite fuses individually using
a hand-held lighter, it did not include igniter cord, igniter
connectors, or stemming. (T. 43 3, Line 20)

The jury could reasonably have found from all of the
foregoing that W.H. Burt was negligent in filling this order
without stating to its customer that he should also purchase
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igniter cord, igniter connectors, and stemming, considering the
elements of the tort and the heightened duty of care set forth
in the proposed model Utah jury instructions quoted above.

CONCLUSION

The case should be reversed and remanded for jury trial
on the claim against W.H. Burt Explosives for its negligent
failure to provide sufficient instructions and/or warnings.

DATED t h i s

/ft

day o f Se

ROBERT \H ./COPIER
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

or may submit written forms of the several special
findings which might properly be made under the
pleadings and evidence; or it may use such other
method of submitting the issues and requiring the
written findings thereon as it deems most appropriate. The court shall give to the jury such explanation
and instruction concerning the matter thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its
findings upon each issue. If in so doing the court
omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by
the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by
jury of the issue so omitted unless before the jury
retires he demands its submission to the jury. As to
an issue omitted without such demand the court may
make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be
deemed to have made a finding in accord with the
judgment on the special verdict.
(b) General verdict accompanied by answer to
interrogatories. The court may submit to the jury,
together with appropriate forms for a general verdict,
written interrogatories upon one or more issues of
fact the decision of which is necessary to a verdict.
The court shall give such explanation or instruction
as may be necessary to enable the jury both to make
answers to the interrogatories and to render a general verdict, and the court shall direct the jury both to
make written answers and to render a general verdict. When the general verdict and the answers are
harmonious, the appropriate judgment upon the verdict and answers shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A. When the answers are consistent with each
other but one or more is inconsistent with the general
verdict, judgment may be entered pursuant to Rule
58A in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding
the general verdict, or the court may return the jury
for further consideration of its answers and verdict or
may order a new trial. When the answers are inconsistent with each other and one or more is likewise
inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment shall
not be entered, but the court shall return the jury for
further consideration of its answers and verdict or
shall order a new trial.
Rule 50. Motion for a directed verdict and for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
(a) Motion for directed verdict; when made; effect. A party who moves for a directed verdict at the
close of the evidence offered by an opponent may offer
evidence in the event that the motion is not granted,
without having reserved the right so to do and to the
same extent as if the motion had not been made. A
motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is
not a waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to
the action have moved for directed verdicts. A motion
for a directed verdict shall state the specific ground(s)
therefor. The order of the court granting a motion for
a directed verdict is effective without any assent of
the jury.
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. Whenever a motion for a directed verdict
made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for
any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have
submitted the action to the jury subject to a later
determination of the legal questions raised by the
motion. Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has moved for a directed verdict
may move to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered
in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict;
or if a verdict was not returned such party, within ten
days after the jury has been discharged, may move for
judgment in accordance with his motion for a directed

Rule 51

verdict. A motion for a new trial may be joined with
this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the
alternative. If a verdict was returned the court may
allow the judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new tria) or direct the entry
of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict was returned the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict
had been directed or may order a new trial.
(c) Same: Conditional rulings on grant of motion.
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, provided for in Subdivision (b) of this
rule, is granted, the court shall also rule on the
motion for a new trial, if any, by determining
whether it should be granted if the judgment is
thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify
the grounds for granting or denying the motion
for a new trial. If the motion for a new trial is
thus conditionally granted, the order thereon
does not affect the finality of the judgment. In
case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on
appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered. In case the
motion for a new trial has been conditionally denied, the respondent on appeal may assert error
in that denial; and if the judgment is reversed on
appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in accordance with the order of the appellate court.
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside
on motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant
to Rule 59 not later than ten days after entry of
the judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
(d) Same: Denial of motion. If the motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict is denied, the
party who prevailed on that motion may, as respondent, assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in
the event the appellate court concludes that the trial
court erred in denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment, nothing in this rule precludes it
from determining that the respondent is entitled to a
new trial, or from directing the trial court to determine whether a new trial shall be granted.
Rule 51. Instructions to jury; objections.
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time
as the court reasonably directs, any party may file
written requests that the court instruct the jury on
the law as set forth in said requests. The court shall
inform counsel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions,
unless the parties stipulate that such instructions
may be given orally or otherwise waive this requirement. If the instructions are to be given in writing,
all objections thereto must be made before the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, objections
may be made to the instructions after they are given
to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider its
verdict. No party may assign as error the giving or
the failure to give an instruction unless he objects
thereto. In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a
party must state distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the grounds for his objection. Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, the appellate
court, in its discretion and in the interests of justice,
may review the giving of or failure to give an instruction. Opportunity shall be given to make objections,
and they shall be made out of the hearing of the jury.
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